I like the idea that you can intend to speak about something a certain way, even when it is not natural to the thing. For example "the collection of circle" or "you know, I wish last week". Not only can you intend to speak this way, you can sometimes even make a bit of sense out of the nonsensical. This gives rise to a general principle, which is that you can speak about something any way you choose.
This principle might help the denouement of the adjective/part distinction. Let me explain: it is not completely crisp that having "parts" (namely sub contexts) is not the same as having modifiers (individual attributes). Take for example a "car" that has a color attribute. But how fast the car can go, is not really a simple modifier. It is a modifier of the car's "performance" sub-context [I call sub-contexts "parts"]. I don't think it helps the study of philosophical ontology, to confuse the self attributes with the part's self attributes.
Nonetheless, the principle says: you can talk about a part's attributes as if they were the self attribute of the original object. You can talk about maximum speed as an attribute of the car. In that sense: does it matter if you get the ontology wrong? Perhaps it does not matter if you are trying to communicate, because subtle context switching is going on all the time when we interpret speech.
But you have to be more careful if you are writing a program. The "subtle" context switching can come later. In the shorter term, you must distinguish carefully between modifiers and parts of a context "object".
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